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THE COMMERCIAL DIFFERENCE
FELIX T. WU*
ABSTRACT
When it comes to the First Amendment, commerciality does, and
should, matter. This Article develops the view that the key distin-
guishing characteristic of corporate or commercial speech is that the
interest at stake is “derivative,” in the sense that we care about the
speech interest for reasons other than caring about the rights of the
entity directly asserting a claim under the First Amendment. To say
that the interest is derivative is not to say that it is unimportant, and
one could find corporate and commercial speech interests to be both
derivative and strong enough to apply heightened scrutiny to the
restrictions that are the usual subject of debate, namely, restrictions
on commercial advertising and restrictions on corporate campaign-
ing.
Distinguishing between derivative and intrinsic speech interests,
however, helps to uncover three types of situations in which lesser or
no scrutiny may be appropriate. The first is in the context of com-
pelled speech. If the entity being compelled is not one with intrinsic
speech rights, this undermines the rationale for subjecting speech
compulsions to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. The
second is in the context of speech among commercial entities. In these
cases, the transaction may be among entities none of which merit
intrinsic First Amendment concern. The third is in the context of
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unwanted marketing. It makes no sense to protect listeners’ access to
information they do not want to receive.
Highlighting the difference that commerciality makes helps to
better explain certain exceptions, or apparent exceptions, that existing
case law already makes to heightened scrutiny. It also provides
insight into a number of current controversies, such as those over
cigarette and product labeling. It has particularly important impli-
cations for consumer privacy regulation, suggesting that regulation
of both the consumer data trade and commercial data collection
merit significantly less scrutiny than might be applied to restrictions
on the privacy-invasive practices of ordinary individuals.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts and commentators have struggled for some time to
determine what, if anything, is different about “commercial speech”
or “corporate speech,” as compared to “fully protected speech.” Many
share an intuition that either commercial speech, corporate speech,
or both are in some way lesser forms of speech, less deserving of the
protections of the First Amendment and more readily subject to
government regulation.1 Others say there is no principled way to
distinguish corporate and commercial speech from types of speech
that the court fully protects, and thus see doctrines that treat
commercial speech or corporate speech as their own First Amend-
ment categories as unwarranted and unprincipled encroachments
upon free expression.2
This Article develops the view that corporate and commercial
speech are different, but that whether the difference matters varies
with the context in which the question arises. The key distinguish-
ing characteristic of corporate or commercial speech is that the
speech interest at stake in these contexts is “derivative,” in the
sense that we care about the speech interest for reasons other than
caring about the rights of the entity directly asserting a claim under
the First Amendment.3 We assign such speech rights to the entity
asserting them for instrumental purposes, to vindicate what are
really the speech rights of others. In some cases, we may mean to
vindicate the rights of others as listeners; in other cases, the rights
1. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (recognizing a
“‘commonsense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs
in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech” (quot-
ing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24
(1976))); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804-05 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
(“[A]n examination of the First Amendment values that corporate expression furthers and the
threat to the functioning of a free society it is capable of posing reveals that it is not fungible
with communications emanating from individuals and is subject to restrictions which individ-
ual expression is not.”).
2. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE
VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 2 (2001).
3. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communi-
cations by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1229, 1233-34 (1991)
(distinguishing between “original” and “derivative” speech rights).
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of others as speakers.4 To be sure, those third-party interests are
potentially implicated in every dispute over speech. What makes
corporate and commercial speech different is that those third-party
interests are the only interests that matter.
The fact that a speech interest is derivative need not undermine
its strength or importance. The key Supreme Court opinions on
corporate and commercial speech have thus far arisen largely in the
context of restrictions on commercial advertising5 and restrictions
on corporate campaigning.6 In these contexts, the derivative nature
of the speech interests at stake is entirely consistent with an argu-
ment that commercial speech and corporate speech should receive
full protection under the First Amendment. Even if third-party
interests are the ones that really matter, one could view those inter-
ests as being equally harmed whether the speech being restricted is
commercial or noncommercial, corporate or noncorporate. For exam-
ple, one could take the view that in all cases speech restrictions
undermine the autonomy of willing listeners.
Distinguishing between derivative and intrinsic speech interests,
however, helps to uncover three types of situations in which the
regulation of corporate or commercial speech does not deserve the
same First Amendment scrutiny as an equivalent regulation of
noncommercial, noncorporate speech. The first is when the regula-
tion compels speech rather than restricts it.7 Speech compulsions
are problematic primarily because of their effects on the person
being compelled. If the compulsion is directed not to a person, but
to an artificial entity with no intrinsic rights to “freedom of mind,”
then the rationale for heightened scrutiny of speech compulsions
dissolves. The same can and should be said about compulsions
directed to individuals who are acting in a commercial, rather than
personal, capacity.
A second context in which the derivative nature of speech in-
terests matters is that of speech that occurs among commercial
4. See id. at 1234 (distinguishing between a “passive derivative speech right,” one which
is meant to protect the interests of listeners, and an “active derivative speech right,” one
which is meant to protect the interests of other speakers).
5. See generally, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
6. See generally, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
7. See infra Part II.
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entities.8 The paradigmatic commercial speech case envisions an
advertiser communicating with a consumer.9 The paradigmatic cor-
porate speech case is usually one in which corporations are speaking
to voters.10 If heightened scrutiny of corporate or commercial speech
is justified primarily by the interests of the noncommercial listener,
then such scrutiny may no longer be justified when the listener is
equally commercial. In that case, none of the parties to the transac-
tion may have an intrinsic First Amendment interest, and thus,
there is no third-party interest to protect by giving the speaker a
derivative claim.
The third situation in which recognizing derivative interests mat-
ters is in the context of unwanted marketing.11 The problem of un-
wanted speech has often been conceptualized as a conflict between
the speaker’s right to speak and the listener’s desire to avoid that
speech.12 When the speech is commercial, however, there are no
longer two sides in conflict. If the commercial speaker’s protection
is derivative of the listener’s interests, then only the listener really
matters. And if listeners’ access to information is the value being
protected, then listeners who are trying to reject that information
neither need nor want such protection.
Highlighting the derivative nature of corporate and commercial
speech interests helps to better explain certain exceptions, or
apparent exceptions, that existing case law already makes to
heightened scrutiny. For example, antitrust laws have long
prohibited price collusion among competitors, without worrying
about any First Amendment limits on the government’s ability to
stop one company from conveying price information to another.13
8. See infra Part III.
9. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 490-91.
10. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 325.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 714 (2000) (casting the relevant question as “wheth-
er the Colorado statute reflects an acceptable balance between the constitutionally protected
rights of law-abiding speakers and the interests of unwilling listeners” and finding that “each
[side] has legitimate and important concerns”). But see McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518,
2546 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Protecting people from speech they do
not want to hear is not a function that the First Amendment allows the government to
undertake in the public streets and sidewalks.”).
13. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1781 (2004).
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Within the framework developed here, this result is easily under-
stood as a natural consequence of the information being passed
solely from one commercial entity to another. Similarly, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act’s restrictions on disseminating consumer
reports make perfect sense under a similar analysis.14
Understanding the “commercial difference” also has important
implications for current controversies, ranging from cigarette and
other product labeling to privacy regulation. In prior work, I exam-
ined the constitutionality of consumer privacy regulation, conclud-
ing that most such regulation should be subject to minimal First
Amendment scrutiny as either a form of commercial compelled
speech or a regulation of speech among commercial entities.15 This
Article provides the general theoretical framework for the conclu-
sions of that earlier work and broadens the application of the
framework beyond the examples explored there.
This Article draws upon a broad literature that so far has
generally addressed the relevant issues in isolation, with respect to
commercial speech, corporate speech, compelled speech, or the
interface between privacy law and freedom of expression.16 Bringing
the disparate theories together within a single framework exposes
the discontinuities among them and reveals why protection for
commercial speech and compelled speech separately need not lead
to the conclusion that commercial compelled speech should be
equally protected or why skepticism about some types of privacy
laws on free expression grounds need not suggest skepticism for all
privacy laws on such grounds.
In what follows, Part I explains the theory of derivative speech
interests and shows how a wide variety of conceptions of corporate
or commercial speech fit the model. Part I.C describes why this
framing does not necessarily change the results of the existing
jurisprudence around corporate campaigning or commercial adver-
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See Felix T. Wu, The Constitutionality of Consumer Privacy Regulation, 2013 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 69, 94.
16. A notable exception is recent works on compelled commercial speech. See, e.g.,
Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the
First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539 (2012); Robert Post, Compelled Commercial
Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867 (2015). My framework is distinct from the ones developed in
those works. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
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tisements. The subsequent Parts describe the types of cases in
which the derivative status of corporate and commercial speech
makes an important difference. Part II explores the implications for
speech compulsions. Part III examines transactions among commer-
cial entities. Finally, Part IV addresses restrictions on unwanted
marketing.
I. DERIVATIVE SPEECH INTERESTS
Sometimes we recognize a First Amendment claim because there
is intrinsic value in protecting the interests of the claimant. In the
paradigmatic First Amendment case, the government has tried to
prevent someone from speaking, and the silenced person is asserting
a personal right not to have the government interfere with his or
her speech.17 There may also be other people whose speech rights
are at stake, but the claimant’s speech rights are at least among
them.
In other cases, however, the entity asserting the First Amend-
ment claim may not be one whose speech rights we actually care
about. Instead, we allow such an entity to assert the claim in order
to protect the interests of others. In such cases, we might say that
the relevant speech interests are “derivative” rather than intrinsic.18
It could be that the ultimate interests are those of the audience or
recipients of the speech.19 Or it could be that the First Amendment
claim helps to protect someone else’s ability to speak.20
Corporate speech and commercial speech should both be under-
stood to be derivative speech interests. In each case, the major
justifications for generally protecting freedom of expression point
toward protecting corporate and commercial speech only to protect
the speech interests of others, not to protect any direct interest of
the corporate or commercial speaker. This understanding of
17. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012) (plurality opinion)
(involving a First Amendment claim raised by a person convicted of lying about having
received the Congressional Medal of Honor); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-45
(1969) (per curiam) (involving a First Amendment claim raised by a Ku Klux Klan leader
convicted of advocating violence under Ohio’s criminal syndicalism statute).
18. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 3, at 1233-34.
19. Dan-Cohen calls these “passive” derivative speech interests. See id. at 1234.
20. Dan-Cohen calls these “active” derivative speech interests. See id. 
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corporate and commercial speech need not undermine the existing
doctrinal structures that the Supreme Court has built around these
types of speech, but it does have important implications that the
subsequent Parts will explore.
A. Corporate Speech
The status of corporations, as compared to natural persons, has
been a pervasive and continuing source of controversy across many
different areas of law.21 Prominent among the controversies is the
question of what sort of protection corporate speech receives under
the First Amendment, particularly in the area of corporate cam-
paign speech and financing. The Supreme Court has alternately
recognized a First Amendment right of corporations to contribute to
campaigns,22 upheld a prohibition on using general corporate trea-
sury funds to support or oppose political candidates,23 and then
reversed course by striking down a prohibition on the use of general
corporate treasury funds for electioneering.24 The Court’s decision
in Citizens United v. FEC in particular has generated not just
academic commentary, but much public discussion about its merits
both as a legal and social policy matter.25
The debate over Citizens United has sometimes been popularly
framed as one about whether “corporations are people.”26 That
21. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (holding
that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 does protect “a for-profit closely held
corporation”); FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 409-10 (2011) (holding that a corporation does
not have “personal privacy” within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act); Santa
Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (syllabus) (noting the unanimous
view of the Court that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause applies to
corporations).
22. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775-76 (1978).
23. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654-55 (1990),
overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
24. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 318-19; see also Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock,
132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam) (reaffirming the holding of Citizens United).
25. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/us/politics/29scotus.html [https://
perma.cc/9CS4-JZTB] (discussing President Obama’s attack on the Citizens United decision
in his State of the Union address).
26. See Ashley Parker, ‘Corporations Are People,’ Romney Tells Iowa Hecklers Angry Over
His Tax Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/us/politics/
12romney.html [https://perma.cc/BW8Q-JTF3]; Ross Ramsey, Court Stays the Course on
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framing, however, is not necessarily helpful to determine what
rights (or obligations) corporations should have under the law or the
Constitution. On the one hand, corporations certainly do not have
the moral valence of human beings. On the other hand, corporations
are legal constructs to which legal rights or duties can attach, just
as they can to individuals.27
The academic debate over the nature of the corporation similarly
does not determine how we ought to regard corporate speech.28 One
view of the corporation is that it should be understood as a “natural
entity,” in the sense that it arises in society through private, rather
than state, action.29 The fact of private creation, though, does not
determine the constitutional status of the thing created. Many
objects of private creation, a building, say, surely lack constitutional
rights.
Alternatively, a corporation may be nothing more than an aggre-
gation of individuals.30 Yet, while in some circumstances aggrega-
tion seems to maintain or even create constitutional rights,31 in
other circumstances, rights that are recognized at the individual
level may not be recognized at the aggregate level.32
Finally, others have viewed a corporation as an artificial entity
that owes its existence entirely to the state’s largesse.33 The arti-
ficial entity view might suggest that because the corporation is a
Politics and Business, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/us/
court-affirms-blessing-on-corporate-financed-political-ads.html [https://perma.cc/N5Z4-VZKZ]
(describing that “[t]he ‘corporations are people’ movement got a boost” in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bullock).
27. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless
the context indicates otherwise ... the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, com-
panies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals.”).
28. See James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1573-74
(making a similar point with respect to corporations asserting a right to free exercise of reli-
gion).
29. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 211.
30. See id. at 222-23.
31. Freedom of association, for example, arises fundamentally from the aggregation of
individuals rather than from a single individual standing alone. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958).
32. Under the doctrine of associational standing, for example, not every association can
assert the rights of its members. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S.
333, 343 (1977).
33. See Millon, supra note 29, at 206.
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creation of the state, the state is free to impose whatever conditions
it likes on its creation and that the corporation cannot have
constitutional rights as against the state. The state’s power to create
or destroy, however, does not necessarily entail a power to restrict
constitutional rights in the objects of its creation,34 and thus, even
under the artificial entity view, corporations might or might not
deserve free speech rights.
Rather than looking to theories of the corporation, we need to look
instead to theories of free expression to understand whether and
why corporate speech deserves protection. Under any of the major
theories of free expression, corporations might contribute in some
way to the goals underlying those theories, but they do so instru-
mentally, rather than intrinsically.35
One major strand of free speech theory values free expression
because of the integral role it plays in the self-development of indi-
viduals.36 Speech and communication are necessary parts of defining
one’s identity. If the government restricts the abilities of its citizens
to express themselves, then it is also limiting those citizens’ abilities
to construct their own identities and to choose their beliefs and
values. Control over expression becomes control over thought.37
Such a situation upends the democratic order, allowing the govern-
ment to control the identities of its citizens, rather than the other
way around.
Values of autonomy and self-development, however, are grounded
in the intrinsic worth of human beings as such. They matter
because people matter.38 Corporations lack such intrinsic worth, and
34. Somewhat analogously, for example, the state’s power to create or eliminate limited
public fora does not give the state carte blanche to discriminate among speakers within the
fora it creates. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (“Through its policy of
accommodating their meetings, the University has created a forum generally open for use by
student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed an obligation to justify its
discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional norms.”). 
35. See generally TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (2012).
36. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
4-5 (1966); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 5 (1993).
37. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 294, 302 (2011).
38. See, e.g., id. at 287 (taking as a foundational assumption “that, for the most part, we
are individual human agents with significant (though importantly imperfect) rational capac-
ities, emotional capacities, perceptual capacities and capacities of sentience—all of which
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there is little reason to attach intrinsic value to the “self-develop-
ment” of corporations, if such a concept even exists.39 Corporations
themselves do not think or believe; they lack the “rational capaci-
ties, emotional capacities, perceptual capacities and capacities of
sentience” that form the foundation for autonomy-based theories of
free expression.40
Another strand of free speech theory values free expression for its
role in fostering deliberative democracy.41 Here too, individuals, not
corporations, are the fundamental units of democracy, and it is the
ability of individuals to make collective decisions that forms the
basis for evaluating whether democratic ideals are being served.
Still another major strand of free speech theory posits that free
expression is the means by which knowledge and truth are devel-
oped. Dissent should be tolerated not necessarily for its own sake,
but because the dissenters might turn out to be right, and the
dissenting views of one era might be the orthodoxy of the next.42
Governments cannot and should not be relied upon to establish
what is true. Instead, truth will emerge, so long as all views are
permitted to vie with each other in the marketplace of ideas.43
exert influence upon each other” and that “our possession and exercise of these capacities
correctly constitute the core of what we value about ourselves”).
39. See PIETY, supra note 35, at 58 (“Corporations are not human beings, so they lack the
expressive interests related to self-actualization and freedom that human beings possess.
Corporations are not moral subjects or ends in themselves. They are a means to an end.”).
40. See Shiffrin, supra note 37, at 287.
41. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
12-16 (1948); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 24-26 (1971) (arguing that “the discovery and spread of political truth” is the only
principled basis upon which to protect freedom of expression (quoting Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring))).
42. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas.”).
43. See id. (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market .... That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”); see also
Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF.
L. REV. 2353, 2363 (2000) (“The theory of the marketplace of ideas focuses on ‘the truth-
seeking function’ of the First Amendment.” (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 52 (1988))). Daniel Farber takes the metaphor of the marketplace one step further,
arguing that “because information is a public good, it is likely to be undervalued by both the
market and the political system,” and therefore, information deserves special constitutional
protection against regulation. Daniel A. Farber, Commentary, Free Speech Without Romance:
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Truth-seeking theories of free expression are relatively listener-
oriented and, thus, are most naturally regarded as ones in which
speaker interests are derivative of listener interests, regardless of
whether the speaker is a corporation. The concept of the market-
place of ideas paints a picture in which many competing ideas are
all made available in the public square so that individuals have
access to them all and, importantly, can exercise their own choices
among them.44 Those individuals, the listeners, are the ultimate
beneficiaries of robust competition among ideas, much as antitrust
law posits that consumers are the ultimate beneficiaries of robust
competition in the market for goods and services.
Nevertheless, one might see truth-seeking theories as implicating
speakers’ interests as well as listeners’ interests. The way to truth
might not be only through listeners’ access to competing views, but
also through speakers giving voice to their own views. Many an idea
that seems good in our heads may seem far less so once put into
words.
But even if we acknowledge that speakers have an interest in
truth seeking, that interest should still be regarded as derivative
with respect to corporate speakers. Knowledge and truth can be
understood as intrinsic values with respect to individuals, but for
corporations, truth is fundamentally instrumental. Better informa-
tion helps companies make money and increases overall economic
efficiency. Those may be worthwhile social goals, but they are not
the sorts of expressive goals protected by the First Amendment.45 In
other words, the ultimate value of knowledge is the knowledge that
individual people have. Corporations may play an important in-
termediate role—more on that in subsequent Parts—but corporate
knowledge is not an end in itself.
Thus, regardless of which of the major theories of free expression
one might adopt, corporate speech is a derivative interest under any
of them. The fundamental values that the First Amendment
protects, whatever they are, inhere in individuals, not corporations.
Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 555 (1991).
44. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 51.
45. See Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 1149, 1217-21 (2005) (highlighting the dangers of blurring the line between political
and economic rights in First Amendment jurisprudence).
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The Citizens United case is perfectly consistent with this view of
corporate speech. Despite the sharp disagreements among the
Justices in the case about the relative value—and danger—of
corporate campaign speech,46 the competing opinions can all be read
to focus at least in some measure on the derivative, rather than
intrinsic, value of the speech. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the dissent
quite explicitly adopted the view of corporate speech as a derivative
speech interest.47 The dissent then went on to argue that a business
corporation cannot be understood to speak for any particular
individuals, whether customers, employees, shareholders, or officers
or directors.48 The dissent further argued that protecting listeners’
interests is precisely what regulation of corporate campaign speech
is designed to do.49
But the majority opinion also described the relevant speech
interests in derivative terms, focusing on the nature of the speech
itself and particularly its value to listeners, rather than on any
intrinsic rights in the corporation. The Court wrote that “[p]olitical
speech is ‘indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this
is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather
than an individual.’”50 Similarly, the Court focused on the need for
corporate “voices and viewpoints” to “reach[] the public and advis[e]
voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.”51
46. Compare, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 446 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Congress has demonstrated a recurrent need to
regulate corporate participation in candidate elections to ‘[p]reserv[e] the integrity of the
electoral process, preven[t] corruption, ... sustai[n] the active, alert responsibility of the
individual citizen,’ protect the expressive interests of shareholders, and ‘[p]reserv[e] ... the
individual citizen’s confidence in government.’” (alterations in original) (quoting McConnell
v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206-07, 206 n.88 (2003))), with id. at 360 (majority opinion) (“The
appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in
our democracy.... The fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend money
to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected
officials. This is inconsistent with any suggestion that the electorate will refuse ‘to take part
in democratic governance’ because of additional political speech made by a corporation or any
other speaker.” (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 144)).
47. See id. at 466 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Corporate
speech, however, is derivative speech, speech by proxy.”).
48. See id. at 467.
49. See id. at 469-72.
50. Id. at 349 (majority opinion) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
777 (1978)).
51. Id. at 354.
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The focus in Citizens United was on the electorate, the recipients of
the political speech at issue, not on the corporate speakers.
To be sure, there is other language in the majority opinion that
seems to personify corporations and to cast them as “disadvan-
taged”52 or “disfavored”53 speakers, whose “voices” have been “muf-
fled.”54 In each case though, such language is followed up with a
focus on voters, or some other set of underlying individuals. In
distinguishing cases in which the Court has allowed speakers to be
disadvantaged, the Court wrote that “[b]y contrast, it is inherent in
the nature of the political process that voters must be free to obtain
information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast
their votes.”55 Later, in specifying who had been disfavored, the
Court characterized the campaign restrictions as creating “disfavor-
ed associations of citizens,” suggesting a concern for individual
speakers that might underlie the corporate form.56 Finally, the
trouble with muffling voices was not the muffled entities’ inability
to speak, but that then “the electorate [has been] deprived of
information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function.”57
Thus, the competing opinions in Citizens United can be under-
stood not as disagreeing about whether voters should be the
ultimate focus of the inquiry, but as disagreeing about whether
voters’ interests would ultimately be served by preventing corporate
voices from “drowning out ... noncorporate voices,”58 or by respecting
those voters’ ability to receive all “voices and viewpoints” and then
“to judge what is true and what is false.”59 The dissenters saw
52. Id. at 340-41 (“By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive
to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s voice.”).
53. Id. at 341 (“We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech,
the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.”).
54. Id. at 354 (“The censorship we now confront is vast in its reach. The Government has
‘muffle[d] the voices that best represent the most significant segments of the economy.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257-58 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
55. Id. at 341.
56. Id. at 356.
57. Id. at 354 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 144
(1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result)).
58. Id. at 470 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59. Id. at 354-55 (majority opinion); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court,
2009 Term—Comment: Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 144-45
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government intervention as appropriate to protect voters, whereas
those in the majority found the very idea of protecting voters from
speech to be illegitimate.60 But all of the Justices seemed to agree
that what ultimately matters is the relationship between govern-
ment and voters, rather than the relationship between government
and corporations and, in that sense, that corporate speech interests
are derivative.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., while in the distinct context of religious freedom rather than
freedom of expression, similarly emphasized the instrumental
nature of corporate rights.61 There the Court explained that the
purpose of the “familiar legal fiction” of including corporations
within the definition of persons “is to provide protection for human
beings”:
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human
beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law
specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including
shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with
a corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the
purpose is to protect the rights of these people.... [P]rotecting the
free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga,
and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the humans who own
and control those companies.62
(2010) (arguing that the competing opinions in Citizens United can be understood as a
competition between the liberty and equality visions of free speech and that its outcome “is
best explained as representing a triumph of the libertarian over the egalitarian vision of free
speech”).
60. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356 (“When Government seeks to use its full power,
including the criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or
what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought. This is
unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.”); see also
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 258-59 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“The premise of the First Amendment is that the American people are neither sheep
nor fools, and hence fully capable of considering both the substance of the speech presented
to them and its proximate and ultimate source.... Given the premises of democracy, there is
no such thing as too much speech.”).
61. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
62. Id. 
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As in Citizens United, the Court in Hobby Lobby made clear that
corporate rights are essentially a fiction, a means by which the
rights of natural persons are protected.63
Academic commentary on corporate speech supports the view that
corporate speech interests are derivative. For example, in rejecting
a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech,
Professor Martin Redish argues that the corporate nature of most
commercial speech is no reason not to protect it.64 In doing so,
however, he emphasizes “the free speech benefits that may flow to
the listener or reader from reading or hearing speech emanating
from corporations,” whether or not “the speaker itself deserves the
benefits of the constitutional protection,” as well as the ways in
which “resort to the corporate form can be viewed as a type of
‘catalytic self-realization’ that facilitates individuals’ efforts to
realize both their goals and their potential.”65 Both of these are
arguments about the derivative value of corporate speech, either to
the audience or to individuals who underlie the corporate form.
Thus, even those who view corporate speech as fully protected have
done so on the basis of interests that lie outside the corporation
itself.
B. Commercial Speech
Much of what has been labeled “commercial speech” under First
Amendment doctrine is also corporate speech, and thus, the deriv-
ative nature of corporate speech interests carries over to most real-
world examples of commercial speech. Not all commercial speech is
corporate though,66 and moreover, the theory of commercial speech
has not necessarily been thought to hinge on whether the speech is
63. Of course, the outcome of the Hobby Lobby case perhaps suggests that the derivative
nature of corporate interests may not make much difference to whether those interests should
be protected, at least according to the Court, but the outcome in Hobby Lobby need not dictate
similar outcomes in the circumstances addressed in this Article. See infra note 179.
64. See Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the
Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 86-87 (2007).
65. Id. at 87 (quoting Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good for
General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
235, 237 (1998)).
66. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978).
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corporate.67 Thus, the nature of commercial speech interests
deserves its own analysis. What that analysis shows is that
commercial speech interests are also derivative, in that it is the
interests of the consumer-listeners that the doctrine is meant to
protect.
Like corporate speech, protection for commercial speech has been
both controversial and in flux over the past few decades. In the early
part of the twentieth century, commercial speech fell wholly outside
the First Amendment.68 Then, in the 1976 decision Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that commercial speech was protected by the
First Amendment, albeit not necessarily to the same extent as
noncommercial speech.69 Not long after, the Court articulated the
intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech restrictions that
it continues to apply today.70 In the decades since, the Court has
tended to strike down laws under the Central Hudson test, rather
than uphold them, leading some commentators to suggest that in
practice, the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech may be disappearing.71
Throughout the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine, even
as its protection under the First Amendment has seemingly gotten
stronger, the Supreme Court has consistently viewed the doctrine
67. See, e.g., Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 55 (2000).
68. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“[T]he Constitution imposes no
... restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”).
69. 425 U.S. 748, 770-73 (1976).
70. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
The Court stated the test as follows:
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.
Id.
71. See Redish, supra note 64, at 67-68 (“In every recent commercial speech case decided
by the Supreme Court, the First Amendment argument prevailed.... While it would be
incorrect to suggest that commercial speech is today deemed fungible with fully protected
speech in all contexts, it is at least true that the gap between the two is far narrower than it
was in 1976.” (footnote omitted)).
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as designed to protect the interests of the audience. The Court has
explained that “the extension of First Amendment protection to
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers
of the information such speech provides.”72 In Virginia Board itself,
the Court emphasized the importance of the “free flow of commercial
information” to both consumers and society as a whole.73 Two de-
cades later, in suggesting that some circumstances might warrant
more stringent review of commercial speech restrictions, Justice
Stevens focused on the effect on consumers to distinguish less trou-
bling restrictions from more troubling ones.74 The focus on the
audience also helps to explain why false or misleading commercial
speech falls entirely outside the First Amendment.75 Such informa-
tion harms consumers, rather than helps them, and pollutes, rather
than promotes, the flow of information.76
Commentators have taken many different approaches to concep-
tualizing commercial speech and are sharply divided about whether
the modern trend toward greater protection for commercial speech
is desirable.77 Nevertheless, there appears to be relatively broad
agreement that commercial speech interests are primarily, if not
exclusively, listener-based, and thus derivative.
This is clearest with respect to those who view commercial speech
as deserving little or no protection under the First Amendment. For
example, Professor Edwin Baker advances a primarily speaker-
based view of the First Amendment that requires the government
to respect the individual autonomy of speakers, and thus he
72. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
73. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-64; see also Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary
Cost of Freedom”? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 28-30 (2012).
74. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (opinion of Stevens,
J.) (“When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from misleading,
deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer
information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the reasons for according consti-
tutional protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict review.”).
75. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
76. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 (“The First Amendment, as we
construe it today, does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial
information flow cleanly as well as freely.”).
77. Compare, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND.
L.J. 981, 981 (2009) (“The world would do well not to follow the lead of the United States in
its view that commercial speech is an aspect of free speech.”), with Redish, supra note 64, at
69 (“[C]riticism of commercial speech ... comes dangerously close to a constitutionally
destructive form of viewpoint-based regulation.”).
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ultimately rejects protection for commercial speech because listener
interests are not at the core of the First Amendment under his
views.78 Professor Tamara Piety accepts that listeners might matter,
but she too is ultimately skeptical of protection for commercial
speech, arguing that the crucial question is “whether the net effect
of commercial speech is to enhance listeners’ self-fulfillment and
autonomy interests” and finding “reason to think that it is not.”79
Others have defended, at least in some measure, the current view
of commercial speech as entitled to some, but subordinate, First
Amendment protection, and that view too is consistent with a
listener-based approach to commercial speech. In defending its
intermediate status, Professor Robert Post defines commercial
speech as “the set of communicative acts about commercial subjects
that within a public communicative sphere convey information of
relevance to democratic decision making but that do not themselves
form part of public discourse.”80 For Professor Post, a key distinction
is between acts that have value as part of public discourse and acts
that simply convey information.81 Acts that are part of public
discourse have intrinsic value to both speakers and listeners,
whereas acts that merely convey information—the set into which
commercial speech falls—derive their value from the value of that
information to those who receive it.82
Even those who argue that there is no principled basis upon
which to distinguish commercial from noncommercial speech have
done so with at least a significant emphasis on the value of the
speech to the listener. For example, in his seminal article arguing
for protection of commercial speech, Professor Redish notes that
“[s]ince advertising performs a significant function for its recipients,
its values are better viewed with the consumer, rather than the
78. See Baker, supra note 77, at 985.
79. PIETY, supra note 35, at 80.
80. Post, supra note 67, at 25.
81. See id. at 20.
82. Professor Post’s conception of commercial speech is not based solely, or even primarily,
however, on the distinction between the value to the speaker and the value to the listener.
Rather, the concept of “public discourse” is central to his theory of the First Amendment, so
that he further distinguishes between conveying information that contributes to public
discourse and conveying information that does not, with only the former receiving heightened
protection under the commercial speech doctrine. See id. at 4, 24. In any event, when the focus
is on conveying information and on the nature of the information conveyed, what matters is
the listener’s perspective, rather than the speaker’s.
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seller, as the frame of reference.”83 Similarly, Professor Redish
argues that if the First Amendment protects criticism of commercial
products of the sort found in, say, Consumer Reports, then it should
equally protect promotion of those same products by their pro-
ducers.84 Seeing these two forms of speech as two sides of the same
coin makes sense primarily if one takes the consumer’s perspective.
Surely the First Amendment value of Consumer Reports lies in its
value to its readers, not its intrinsic value to the consumer organiza-
tion itself.85 Casting commercial speech as analytically similar to
Consumer Reports thus also highlights the listener value of the
speech.86
To be sure, commentators sometimes suggest that commercial
speech may have First Amendment value for speakers as well. For
example, some argue that commercial advertisements involve just
as much artistry as artistic works that are fully protected under the
First Amendment.87 The implication then is that all of the reasons
for protecting artistic works, including reasons that focus on the
creators and disseminators of those works, apply equally to com-
mercial advertisements.88
The trouble with this line of reasoning is that it wrongly assumes
that speech protected in one way is necessarily protected in all.
Debates over the regulation of commercial advertisements are about
the regulation of advertisements as advertisements,89 not about
83. Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and
the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 434 (1971).
84. See Redish, supra note 64, at 131-32.
85. See Farber, supra note 43, at 566 (discussing the value of the information in product
reviews to consumers).
86. See also Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA.
L. REV. 627, 643 (1990) (arguing that restricting commercial speech can lead to the result that
“the opinion of one of the groups most interested in the debate has been obliterated from
public view” (emphasis added)).
87. See, e.g., id. at 639 (characterizing a television commercial as “a thirty-second mini-
drama that can stand on its own as a piece of film”).
88. See Redish, supra note 83, at 446-47 (“[T]he first amendment does recognize an
interest existing in the speaker as well as the listener, and purely persuasive materials may
serve that end. Much advertising which does not convey concrete information nevertheless
represents the artistic creation of an individual, and as such deserves recognition as first
amendment speech.” (footnote omitted)).
89. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L.
REV. 1153, 1164-65 (2012) (discussing the government’s aims in regulating commercial
speech).
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their regulation as artistic works. What is being targeted is not the
artistic choices that might conceivably be “a form of individual self-
expression” for the “ad-men,”90 but rather the commercial messages
that those artistic choices are being used to convey.
More generally, the invocation of a First Amendment interest in
“individual self-expression” suggests the argument that commercial
speech contributes to the individual self-expression of the seller, at
least when the seller is not a corporate entity. The concept of
individual self-expression has thus far mostly been raised on the
buyer, or listener, side, with courts and commentators characteriz-
ing the receipt of commercial speech as being no less important to
self-development than the receipt of many types of fully protected
speech.91 One could conceivably argue that the same self-develop-
ment occurs on the speaker side, regardless of whether the speech
is commercial or noncommercial.
Even with respect to the listener-centric version of this argument,
there may be reasons to be skeptical. Buyers may have an interest
in receiving commercial speech, but having an interest is not the
same thing as having a First Amendment interest.92 The interest
could be a purely private, property interest—that of wanting to buy
the best possible products at the lowest possible prices—rather than
the broader social interest in individual self-expression.93
Moreover, even an interest in self-development or identity forma-
tion, while arguably a social rather than merely private interest,
may not necessarily be an interest the First Amendment is designed
to protect. One could easily view virtually any human activity as
contributing in some way to individual self-development and
90. Redish, supra note 83, at 447.
91. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
763 (1976) (“As to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial informa-
tion, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most
urgent political debate.”); Redish, supra note 83, at 445 (“Just as we require a free flow of
information regarding the political process because we value the concept of political self-
realization, so too, should we require an open exchange of ideas and information in the
marketplace that will help the individual govern his personal life.”).
92. See Brudney, supra note 89, at 1183-86.
93. See id. at 1185 (“[C]ommercial speech’s persuasive or informative function is only to
induce the purchase or sale of the products it proposes by or to individuals for their own
consumption or enjoyment. Speech with so limited a function focuses only on individuals’
private or personal good, not on matters of public interest or the societal values or attitudes
with which the First Amendment is concerned.” (footnote omitted)).
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identity formation.94 The First Amendment, though, is premised on
the idea that speech is special. If the speech exception is not to
swallow the rule, and I think it ought not do so, then the relevant
First Amendment interest cannot be conceived of as broadly as self-
development or identity formation generally. Otherwise, the First
Amendment could require scrutiny of every government restriction.
Still, one could argue (and some have argued) that commercial
speech contributes not just to identity formation generally, but spe-
cifically to the development of the capacity for rational thinking and
decision-making, because information about commercial products,
perhaps especially such information, encourages people to engage
in these processes.95 An interest in this kind of “rational self-ful-
fillment” is arguably an important First Amendment value.96 But
this view, even if persuasive, simply drives home the point that
protection of commercial speech is justified by taking the perspec-
tive of the listener, rather than the speaker. It is the listener who
engages in “consider[ing] the competing information, weigh[ing] it
mentally in the light of the goals of personal satisfaction he has set
for himself” and who is thereby using commercial speech to contrib-
ute to his “rational self-fulfillment.”97 The commercial speaker does
no such thing.
A final line of argument is to suggest that commercial speech
should be as fully protected as noncommercial speech because there
is simply no way to distinguish one from the other.98 If the category
is incoherent, then its use to diminish protection for certain types of
speech must be illegitimate.99 This would presumably mean that
whatever speaker-based values the First Amendment protects gen-
erally would also be implicated by speech in the supposedly illusory
category of “commercial speech.”
94. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First
Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1619-22 (1987).
95. See Redish, supra note 83, at 444 (“Some rational development is better than none,
and given the current apathy on the part of many segments of the public towards issues of
great political and social concern, it is arguable that for many, the only realistic means to
stimulate use of the rational processes is to encourage the rational solution of problems that
face individuals in their everyday life.”).
96. See id. at 443-44.
97. Id. 
98. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 86, at 638-48.
99. See Redish, supra note 64, at 122 (characterizing the use of the commercial speech
category as unprincipled, and hence a form of “viewpoint discrimination”).
2028 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:2005
There is certainly truth in the claim that the Supreme Court has
never been very clear on precisely what counts as commercial
speech. At times, the Court has characterized commercial speech as
that which “does ‘no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion.’”100 In other cases, the Court has held that the category extends
beyond that narrow formulation, and it has articulated factors that,
at least in conjunction with one another, can trigger the commercial
speech doctrine.101 In Central Hudson, the Court suggested that
commercial speech is “expression related solely to the economic in-
terests of the speaker and its audience.”102 All of those formulations
have been criticized as underinclusive, overinclusive, or both.103
It is precisely the speaker’s First Amendment interests, or lack
thereof, though, that not only justify treating commercial speech
differently, but also provide a coherent way to define the category,
even if its boundaries are fuzzy. The seller hawking his wares is not
thereby expressing himself in the First Amendment sense, at least
no more so than the very act of selling is itself expressive. If commer-
cial transactions fall outside the protection of the First Amend-
ment—and they must if the First Amendment is to have any
meaningful limits—then one can sensibly draw a distinction based
on the extent to which certain speech is sufficiently akin to a com-
mercial transaction to be treated like one, and thus to at least merit
different First Amendment treatment from fully protected speech.
The transactional nature of such speech sets it apart.
We can evaluate this question of whether speech is, or should be
construed as, no more than a part of a commercial transaction, from
either of two perspectives: the speaker’s perspective or the listener’s
perspective. Those perspectives need not align. The category of what
100. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
n.24 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
101. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983) (pointing to the
“fact that these pamphlets are conceded to be advertisements,” “the reference to a specific
product,” and “the fact that [the speaker] has an economic motivation for mailing the
pamphlets” and holding that the “combination of all these characteristics ... provides strong
support for the ... conclusion that the informational pamphlets are properly characterized as
commercial speech,” even though any one factor standing alone might not have been suf-
ficient).
102. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
103. See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 86, at 639-41.
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has traditionally been called “commercial speech” is precisely that
which is merely transactional from the speaker’s perspective.
For example, in the case of an ordinary commercial advertise-
ment, the advertiser’s interest is in the ability of the advertisement
to increase sales of its goods or services—that is, to drive commer-
cial transactions. For that reason, an ordinary commercial adver-
tisement is commercial speech. We can remain agnostic, though, as
to the interests of the audience viewing the advertisement. The
recipients may be using the advertisement simply to increase the
efficiency of their consumption of goods and services, and thus, the
speech may be effectively transactional from the audience’s perspec-
tive as well. But alternatively, the advertisement may be serving
the audience’s general interest in knowing more about the world,
including about the goods and services that the advertiser sells. In
that case, the value of the speech from the audience’s perspective
potentially goes beyond its value for commercial transactions.
The fact that we are asking the question of whether the speech is
merely transactional, but only from the speaker’s perspective, helps
to explain several aspects of the commercial speech doctrine as it
has developed. First, it explains why commercial speech includes
that which “does no more than propose a commercial transaction,”104
but the category is not limited to that speech. Proposing a commer-
cial transaction is surely a part of the transaction itself, but it need
not be the only way to be a part of the transaction. Moreover, the
idea that it is the speaker’s perspective that matters explains why
tests for commercial speech often look to the interests and motiva-
tions of the speaker.105 Looking for economic interests and motiva-
tions, however, is merely the means to determine whether speech is
transactional, rather than being the defining characteristic of com-
mercial speech.106
Finally, the asymmetric nature of the inquiry explains why even
those who agree on what commercial speech is potentially disagree
on how to treat it. Speech can be merely transactional from the
104. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
105. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67 (considering the “economic motivation” of the speaker);
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561 (considering the “economic interests of the
speaker”).
106. See Redish, supra note 64, at 87-88 (“The institutional media ... are as much profit-
making corporations as is any commercial advertiser.”).
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speaker’s perspective and still leave the full range of options as to
how to characterize it from the listener’s perspective. It is one’s view
of the listener’s perspective that determines the appropriate treat-
ment under the First Amendment. But it is the listener’s perspec-
tive that matters. In other words, the commercial speaker’s First
Amendment claim is derivative.
C. Derivative Interests in Traditional Settings
To say that corporate and commercial speech interests are
derivative is not necessarily to undercut their strength. One could
recognize those interests as derivative, and largely listener-based,
and nevertheless advocate heightened, even strict, scrutiny in the
core cases in which those interests have traditionally arisen.
The issue of corporate speech has arisen largely in the context of
corporate campaigning.107 Even if the intrinsic interests at stake in
such cases are those of the voters who are the target of such
campaigns, rather than the corporations mounting the campaigns,
one could justify heightened scrutiny of government attempts to
restrict such campaigning.108 Particularly in the political context,
one could argue that voters need the fullest possible information in
order to make informed voting decisions.109 Thus, we might be
skeptical of any government regulation that restricts the speech
available to voters.110 One might even suggest that certain view-
points are only likely to be voiced by corporations, rather than
individuals—for example, viewpoints that are pro-business or anti-
labor.111 In that case, restricting corporate campaigning might
deprive voters of information necessary to evaluate particular sides
of contested issues.112
107. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
108. See, e.g., id. at 354-55.
109. See, e.g., id. at 354.
110. See, e.g., id. at 355-56.
111. Cf. Redish, supra note 64, at 69 (arguing that attacks on commercial speech protection
“constitute[], facilitate[], or, at the very least, come[] dangerously close to a constitutionally
destructive form of viewpoint-based regulation”). But see Robert C. Post, Viewpoint Discrimin-
ation and Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 169, 169 (2007) (arguing that Professor
Redish’s conception of viewpoint discrimination “is too confused and uncertain to carry the
weight that Redish imposes on it”).
112. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356 (“When Government seeks to use its full power,
including the criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her information or
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Similarly, the question of commercial speech has been prominent
in the context of commercial advertisements, particularly advertise-
ments for vices such as tobacco, liquor, and gambling.113 Even if we
think that advertisers do not have an intrinsic right against
interference with their advertisements, we might think that
consumers do have an intrinsic right not to have the government
dictate what information about lawful products they can receive.114
We might be particularly wary of what seem to be paternalistic laws
that hide information from people supposedly for their own good.115
To be sure, the arguments in favor of fully protecting corporate
campaigning or commercial advertisements are not necessarily
persuasive. One could instead think that corporate participation in
campaigns distorts the available speech, rather than simply adding
to it.116 One could largely take the same view of most commercial
advertisements.117
Framed in this way, these debates can be understood as a
microcosm of much larger debates over the proper relationship
between the government and citizens under the Constitution. On
the one hand, there is the libertarian perspective, under which the
prime directive is to ensure that the government does not interfere
unduly with the private choices of individuals.118 Under this
perspective, any government interference with the receipt of infor-
what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought. This is
unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.”).
113. See generally Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (tobacco); Greater
New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (gambling); 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (liquor).
114. See, e.g., Va. State. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976).
115. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“The First Amendment
directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for
what the government perceives to be their own good. That teaching applies equally to state
attempts to deprive consumers of accurate information about their chosen products.”); id. at
518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“In cases such as this,
in which the government’s asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service
ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace ... such an ‘interest’ is per
se illegitimate.”).
116. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 469-72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
117. See PIETY, supra note 35, at 64-65.
118. See Sullivan, supra note 59, at 145.
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mation is suspect.119 An alternative is to take an egalitarian per-
spective, which posits that the government’s role is to try to create
a level playing field within which individuals can exercise their
choices.120 Under this perspective, restrictions on corporate and com-
mercial speech may be appropriate to correct disparities between
the power of corporations or commercial sellers and individuals.121
In this way, debates over corporate campaigning and commercial
advertisements are not only analytically similar to each other; they
are similar to debates over, say, affirmative action as well.122
These questions are not settled one way or another merely by
recognizing the derivative nature of corporate or commercial speech
interests. Indeed, given the centrality of the broader questions to
which they connect, it would be quite startling if they were.
Framing the issue in terms of derivative interests does not resolve
whether the government can restrict corporate campaigning or
commercial advertisements. In other types of situations, however,
the derivative nature of the speech interests does matter, and it is
to those situations that we now turn.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPELLED SPEECH
One implication of corporate and commercial speech interests
being derivative is that compelling these forms of speech need not
raise the usual First Amendment concerns. In the context of fully
protected speech, the Supreme Court has held that compelling
speech is just as problematic as restricting it.123 But that shorthand
equivalence elides the fact that the rationales for scrutinizing
speech compulsions differ substantially from the rationales for
119. See id.
120. See id. at 144-45.
121. See id.
122. Compare, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not
only because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives,
but also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race
relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”), with Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Actions designed to burden groups long
denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to hasten the day
when entrenched discrimination and its aftereffects have been extirpated.”).
123. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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scrutinizing speech restrictions. When primarily listener interests
are at stake, there is little reason to be concerned about compelled
speech.
A. The Misfit Between Listener Interests and Scrutiny of
Compelled Speech
At first glance, it is not at all clear why compelled speech should
be problematic under the First Amendment. For example, if we are
concerned primarily about protecting the marketplace of ideas, then
compelled speech seems only to be adding to that marketplace, and
so long as we do not then restrict how people can respond to the
compelled speech, we should be confident that truth and right
thinking will win out in the end regardless of what has been com-
pelled.124
The problem, if there is one, seems to be in the way that such
compulsions interfere with the “individual freedom of mind.”125
Compelling individuals to speak, even in circumstances in which it
is clear that they might or might not be sincere, fails to accord due
respect for those individuals as autonomous, thinking human beings
whose views are independent of those of the state.126 It also under-
mines First Amendment values of sincerity and truth that should
be nurtured in citizen-speakers.127 And it coerces thought in a
manner that is illegitimate because it bypasses the speaker’s critical
faculties in favor of persuasion through repetition.128
In other words, compelled speech is problematic because of its
effects on the speaker. These speaker-based rationales for scrutiniz-
ing compelled speech are irrelevant when our primary concern is
with listeners rather than speakers. From the listeners’ point of
view, compelled speech is not much different from the government
124. Cf. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 664 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“It is not even remotely
suggested that the requirement for saluting the flag involves the slightest restriction against
the fullest opportunity on the part both of the children and of their parents to disavow as
publicly as they choose to do so the meaning that others attach to the gesture of salute.”).
125. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
126. See Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in FIRST
AMENDMENT STORIES 99, 124-25 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012).
127. See id. at 125-27.
128. See id. at 128-29.
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choosing and promoting a view, which it is permitted to do under
the government speech doctrine.129 Unlike the speaker, the listener
is being persuaded through reason, and with respect for the
listener’s ability to make autonomous choices.130 In situations in
which the speaker has no intrinsic speech interest, then the com-
pelled speech harms neither the speaker nor the listener.
One straightforward conclusion of this analysis is that, from a
First Amendment perspective, compelling a corporation to speak
harms nothing with respect to the corporation itself.131 Corporations
are not autonomous, thinking beings that the state must respect as
such. Nor are they citizens to be nurtured. Repeated utterances do
not have the psychological effects on corporations that they do on
individuals.
The rationales for scrutinizing speech compulsions are equally
misplaced with respect to noncorporate commercial speech. To see
why, we first need to understand what we mean by commercial com-
pelled speech. As previously described, the defining characteristic
of commercial speech is that it should be regarded from the
speaker’s perspective as no more than a part of a commercial trans-
action.132 When the government compels such speech, it is commer-
cial compelled speech.
This focus on the connection to a commercial transaction is neces-
sary to make sense of the category of commercial compelled speech.
Many of the usual indicia of commercial speech do not translate well
into the realm of compelled speech. For example, it makes no sense
129. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005).
130. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1302-03
(2014). There may be circumstances in which the means for conveying a message are so
manipulative that they impinge upon the autonomy of the listener. See id. at 1304-08. For
purposes of such an analysis, however, it should make no difference whether the government
directly conveys the message or conveys it through private parties. If the latter, it would not
be the compulsion itself that would be the source of any First Amendment difficulties.
131. See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 126, at 127 n.123 (stating that the rationale in
Barnette applies “only to natural persons,” rather than “corporate entities”).
132. See supra Part I.B. Being a part of the transaction itself is not the same as being the
subject of a transaction. Much noncommercial speech is bought and sold. See Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (addressing
books, movies, and newspapers); Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and Mandatory
Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment’s Limit on Compelled Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2347, 2366 (2013) (addressing physician speech).
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to look for an economic motivation in a compelled speaker133 because
the very point of the compulsion is to overcome the absence of any
motivation to speak at all. Similarly, because the government
dictates the form of the speech, the form need not have any
particular relationship to whether the speech is commercial.134
When the speech that is compelled is incidental to a commercial
transaction, it is far less likely to raise the usual concerns over
compelling speech. Scrutiny of compelled speech is rooted in con-
cerns over a disrespect for, or undue influence over, the speaker’s
capacity for thought and decision-making.135 But commercial speech
does not implicate the speaker’s capacity for thought and decision-
making, at least no more so than commercial transactions do.
Whether compelled or not, commercial speech is conveyed by the
speaker with a measure of detachment not found in ordinary speech.
A pledge of allegiance is meaningless without its being recited by
the person compelled.136 Commercial speech can be attached to the
product being sold,137 or posted on a website,138 and have the in-
tended effect. The point of the pledge is its effect on the speaker,
while the point of commercial compelled speech is the availability
of the speech to the listener, rather than any effect on the speaker.
The result is that the speaker-based concerns over compelled speech
do not apply to commercial compelled speech.
Thus, until one can identify some other speech interest at
stake,139 the starting point of the analysis should be that because
corporate and commercial speakers do not themselves have intrinsic
speech interests, their speech can be compelled without triggering
any form of heightened First Amendment scrutiny. Thus far, courts
have largely gotten this analysis exactly backwards, assuming the
existence of a general First Amendment prohibition on compelled
133. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
134. Cf. id. 
135. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
136. Cf. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943).
137. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (involving
cigarette labels), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (en banc).
138. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 522, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (involving
conflict minerals disclosures on a company’s website).
139. See infra Part II.C.
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speech from which any exceptions need to be justified.140 But when
the interests usually at stake with respect to compelled speech are
absent, it is coverage under the First Amendment, rather than its
absence, that needs justification.
B. The Zauderer Standard
The rationales for scrutinizing compelled speech do not apply
when the only First Amendment interests are those of the listeners.
In particular, because commercial speech is defined by the speech
being merely transactional from the speaker’s perspective, commer-
cial compelled speech should generally merit no First Amendment
scrutiny.
This understanding of the relationship between compelled speech
and commercial speech is what should inform the proper interpreta-
tion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Zauderer v. Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel,141 a key case that lower courts have consistently
misinterpreted. In Zauderer, the Court applied a relatively relaxed
form of scrutiny to a requirement that attorneys include certain
information in advertisements.142 Lower courts have interpreted the
case as creating an exception, and a narrow one at that, to the usual
rule of heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.143 The key
question with respect to Zauderer, though, is not why the Court
applied a lower form of scrutiny than Central Hudson.144 The
question is why the Court applied any kind of scrutiny at all.145
140. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1211-12 (analyzing the appropriate level of First
Amendment scrutiny by first describing a general rule that “[a]ny attempt by the government
... to compel individuals to express certain views ... is subject to strict scrutiny” and then
stating that “[c]ourts have recognized a handful of ‘narrow and well-understood exceptions’
to the general rule that content-based speech regulations—including compelled speech—are
subject to strict scrutiny” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)));
see also Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1996) (taking as a starting
point for the court’s analysis that “[t]he right not to speak inheres in political and commercial
speech alike”).
141. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
142. See id. at 651-53.
143. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
144. But see Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en
banc) (suggesting that “one could think of Zauderer largely as an application of Central
Hudson, where several of Central Hudson’s elements have already been established” (internal
quotation omitted)).
145. That is to say, scrutiny above rational basis review. The Zauderer standard has
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Zauderer involved an attorney disciplinary action based on the
attorney’s failure to make certain disclosures in his advertise-
ments.146 The attorney advertised that he took cases on a “contin-
gent fee basis” and that “[i]f there is no recovery, no legal fees are
owed by our clients,” but he failed to disclose that clients might still
be liable for costs, as opposed to attorneys’ fees, even if they lost
their case.147
The Court rejected the application of strict scrutiny to the
disclosure requirement in the case, distinguishing earlier cases
involving noncommercial compulsions. It explained:
Ohio has not attempted to “prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” The
State has attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox in
commercial advertising, and its prescription has taken the form
of a requirement that appellant include in his advertising purely
factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under
which his services will be available. Because the extension of
First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified
principally by the value to consumers of the information such
speech provides, appellant’s constitutionally protected interest
in not providing any particular factual information in his
advertising is minimal.148
The Court then went on to hold that while some scrutiny under
the First Amendment was appropriate, a relatively minimal level of
scrutiny would suffice:
sometimes been characterized as a form of rational basis review. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds, 696
F.3d at 1212 (describing the Zauderer standard as “akin to rational-basis review”). To the
extent that scrutiny under the Zauderer standard is substantially weaker than an application
of the Central Hudson test, it is perhaps more like rational basis review. At the same time
though, the analysis the Court did to establish that the “disclosure requirements are
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers” seems more
extensive than what one would ordinarily expect from rational basis review. Zauderer, 471
U.S. at 651. For example, it seemed to matter to the Court that “the possibility of deception
is ... self-evident ... in this case,” rather than “speculative,” whereas even a speculative
interest could pass rational basis review so long as it is rational. Id. at 652-53.
146. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 631, 633.
147. Id. at 630-31, 633.
148. Id. at 651 (internal citations omitted) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
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We do not suggest that disclosure requirements do not
implicate the advertiser’s First Amendment rights at all. We
recognize that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure
requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling
protected commercial speech. But we hold that an advertiser’s
rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure require-
ments are reasonably related to the State’s interest in prevent-
ing deception of consumers.149
Because the laypersons at whom the advertisements were target-
ed would have no idea about the distinction between “legal fees” and
“costs,” the Court found the possibility of deception to be “self-
evident” and the required disclosure to be a perfectly reasonable
way of trying to cure that deception.150
Lower courts have consistently framed the standard articulated
in Zauderer as an exception to a general rule of heightened scrutiny
of compelled speech, grappling only with the question of just how far
the Zauderer “exception” extends. For example, the D.C. Circuit
held en banc that Zauderer applies even when the government’s
interest in disclosure is something other than “preventing deception
of consumers,” overruling previous panel decisions that had held or
suggested otherwise.151 While recognizing that the interest in
avoiding deception need not be the only legitimate interest, the D.C.
Circuit continued to require some sufficient government interest in
order to justify applying the Zauderer standard.152 Moreover, the
D.C. Circuit appears to have continued to limit Zauderer to
disclosures of “purely factual and uncontroversial information.”153
Both of these limits to Zauderer assume that relaxed scrutiny is the
exception, rather than the rule.
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 652-53.
151. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en
banc), overruling Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and Nat’l
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013), and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA,
696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
152. See Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 23 (“Beyond the interest in correcting misleading or
confusing commercial speech, Zauderer gives little indication of what type of interest might
suffice.”).
153. Id. at 27 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651); see also R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216
(quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
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But as previously explained, there is little justification for
scrutinizing compulsions directed to corporate or commercial speak-
ers.154 Thus, relaxed scrutiny of such compulsions ought to be the
rule, not the exception. If anything, what requires explanation is
why the Court in Zauderer bothered to evaluate the government’s
interest for anything beyond bare plausibility.
In fact, the Court appears to have scrutinized the compelled
disclosure in Zauderer not because it was a compelled disclosure per
se, but because it was a regulation of attorney advertising. The First
Amendment issue that it identified was that of “chilling protected
commercial speech.”155 And it repeatedly referred to the First
Amendment rights as those of the “advertiser.”156 The state’s regula-
tion was described as only an attempt “to prescribe what shall be
orthodox in commercial advertising.”157
Viewed as a regulation of advertising, it makes sense that the
Court treated the Central Hudson test as the baseline for evaluating
the state’s disclosure requirement and that the Court needed to
justify its departure from that baseline. The Central Hudson test
was designed to establish the level of scrutiny for government
attempts to restrict commercial advertising.158 Because the required
disclosure in Zauderer was triggered by the attorney advertising,159
it could be understood as a limitation on that advertising: effec-
tively, Ohio was saying that attorneys could not advertise “no fees”
without also explaining that “no fees” did not mean no costs. The
speech that really mattered for First Amendment purposes in
Zauderer was the original “no fees” claim, not the required add-on,
and scrutiny was necessary to ensure that the “no fees” speech
would not be chilled.160
In that sense, Zauderer might be an exception, but an exception
only to the scrutiny that would otherwise apply to a restriction on
commercial speech. What it says is that if a disclosure is of “purely
factual and uncontroversial information,” then it can be required of
154. See Part II.A.
155. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
156. Id. 
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64
(1980).
159. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652.
160. See id. at 653 & n.15.
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an advertisement without unduly chilling that advertisement, and
thus, the government needs only a sufficient interest to support
such a requirement, rather than needing to satisfy the full Central
Hudson test.161
Zauderer says nothing about what happens if the disclosure
requirement is triggered not by commercial advertising, but by some
other nonspeech commercial activity. Without the threat that a
disclosure requirement might chill speech, the analysis should fall
back to the baseline of no scrutiny for compulsions of corporate or
commercial speakers.
The D.C. Circuit has gotten this exactly backwards, somehow
finding that the more relaxed scrutiny in Zauderer was justified
only because commercial advertising was involved, and declining to
apply the Zauderer standard beyond the contexts of “advertising or
product labeling at the point of sale.”162 Such a result runs directly
contrary to an analysis of the First Amendment interests at stake.
The D.C. Circuit applied heightened scrutiny to, and struck down,
an SEC rule requiring certain securities issuers to state whether the
minerals they use are “conflict free” because the disclosures were “to
be made on each reporting company’s website and in its reports to
the SEC” rather than in “advertising or ... point of sale disclo-
sures.”163 Nowhere in its opinion did the court explain what First
Amendment interests were being protected by the scrutiny it
imposed, let alone why the distinction it drew would sensibly protect
those interests.164
Nor is it necessary to limit relaxed scrutiny to compelled disclo-
sures of “purely factual and uncontroversial information,” as the
161. See id. at 651.
162. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 522, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
163. Id. at 522.
164. See id. at 535-36 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting). The majority opinion attempted to sup-
port its distinction with two Supreme Court cases, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995), and United States v. United Foods, Inc.,
533 U.S. 405 (2001). See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 523 (majority opinion). Neither case
supports the majority’s analysis. Hurley involved a noncommercial speaker. See Hurley, 515
U.S. at 559 (“The issue in this case is whether Massachusetts may require private citizens who
organize a parade to include among the marchers a group imparting a message the organizers
do not wish to convey.” (emphasis added)). United Foods was part of a distinct line of cases
involving compelled funding of advertisements that in any event eventually resulted in a
permissive First Amendment standard. See Wu, supra note 15, at 86-87.
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D.C. Circuit has done.165 As I have argued previously, distinguishing
between factual and normative compulsions is murky and a shaky
basis upon which to hinge the level of scrutiny.166 Virtually any
seemingly factual disclosure conveys some implicit viewpoint. The
inclusion of trans fat contents on a nutrition label surely suggests
that trans fats matter, and given the social context, it probably
suggests they should be avoided.
More importantly, if compelling corporate or commercial speakers
does not interfere with any First Amendment interests because the
entity compelled has none, then it does not matter whether the
speech is factual or normative. To be sure, less factual information
might also be less tied to a commercial transaction and therefore
less likely to be commercial compelled speech. But the compulsion
of information tied to a transaction should not be scrutinized just
because the information might implicitly convey a viewpoint.167
Zauderer may have limited its holding to factual disclosures, but
that was because the case was about restricting commercial adver-
tisements. Requiring a nonfactual, controversial disclosure in a
commercial advertisement might well discourage the speaker from
advertising in the first place, in a way that a factual, noncontrover-
sial disclosure would not. Of course, the same could be said of
commercial transactions—that requiring disclosures could discour-
age those transactions. The crucial difference is that commercial
165. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 527. Some commentators have argued in favor of
a similar distinction. See Keighley, supra note 16, at 569 (“[W]hen the government moves
beyond compelled speech that provides descriptive information about a given product or
service, to compelled speech that urges the audience to take a certain course of action, the
government no longer compels the provision of factual and uncontroversial information.
Instead, the government compels ‘normative speech,’ and such compelled speech should not
be subject to rational basis review.”); Post, supra note 16, at 901 (defending the view “that
government may require the disclosure only of purely factual and ‘uncontroversial’ informa-
tion”); see also Corbin, supra note 130, at 1303-04 (arguing that compelled speech is more
problematic “when it attempts to persuade rather than just inform” or when it is “manipu-
lative”).
166. See Wu, supra note 15, at 77, 81.
167. Cf. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 530 (“The label ‘[not] conflict free’ is a metaphor
that conveys moral responsibility for the Congo war. It requires an issuer to tell consumers
that its products are ethically tainted, even if they only indirectly finance armed groups. An
issuer, including an issuer who condemns the atrocities of the Congo war in the strongest
terms, may disagree with that assessment of its moral responsibility.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2014))).
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advertisements are protected by the First Amendment, but commer-
cial transactions are not.168
Thus, for example, in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, the D.C.
Circuit was wrong to impose heightened scrutiny on the FDA’s
requirement of graphical warning labels on cigarette packages.169
The FDA had sought to update the mandatory cigarette warning
labels with new text and with graphical images to accompany each
of the new warnings.170 The D.C. Circuit held that because the
graphical warnings did not consist solely of “purely factual and
uncontroversial information,” the mandatory warnings were subject
to at least intermediate scrutiny—scrutiny which the regulation was
not able to bear.171
But R.J. Reynolds is a corporate, commercial speaker, and thus
the government’s insistence that certain speech be made available
as part of the transaction of buying and selling cigarettes harms no
First Amendment interests. This remains true even if some of the
messages implicitly or explicitly encourage consumers to quit smok-
ing.172 Such messages are certainly against the cigarette companies’
financial interests, but they hardly constitute some form of disre-
spect for the rational faculties of the cigarette sellers, even if those
sellers were individuals. The compulsion of even normative commer-
cial messages potentially merits little First Amendment scrutiny.
C. Limitations on Compelled Corporate or Commercial Speech
The government’s ability to compel corporate or commercial
speech is not unlimited, however, and there are a number of
situations in which compelled corporate or commercial speech might
appropriately merit some greater level of First Amendment scrutin-
y. Greater scrutiny might apply to compulsions directed at certain
types of corporations, particularly those that are more expressive in
nature. Greater scrutiny might also apply when the compulsion is
a condition of the compelled entity’s own speech. Finally, we might
168. See supra Part I.B.
169. See 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
170. Id. at 1208-09.
171. Id. at 1216-17, 1222.
172. See id. at 1216-18.
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scrutinize any government compulsion in which the government
attempts to hide its own speech as that of another.
1. Distinctions Among Corporate Speakers
Corporations come in a wide variety of types, and some might
more plausibly assert speaker-based interests than others. The key
concept developed by Professor Meir Dan-Cohen is that of “role-
distance.”173 When a person’s role within an organization is closely
tied to her own personal identity, we say that the role-distance is
small; when the organizational and personal roles are relatively
distinct, we say that the role-distance is large.174 When the role-
distance is small, we might worry that a compulsion on the corpo-
rate entity will function like a compulsion on an individual or set of
individuals, in such a way as to raise the “freedom of mind” concerns
previously discussed.
For the usual for-profit corporation, no one, whether employee,
executive, or shareholder, has such a small role-distance,175 and as
a result, compulsions applied to such corporations are unproblem-
atic. This is particularly true with respect to major publicly traded
corporations,176 which are often the ones trying to assert speech
rights. Employees, executives, and shareholders of such corpora-
tions are particularly likely to have detached roles.177 For example,
compelling R.J. Reynolds to place a particular image on its cigarette
packages is far removed from compelling speech from any particular
employee, executive, or shareholder of the company. Even with
respect to a close corporation, corporate laws themselves operate to
encourage and enforce a certain measure of separation between in-
dividual and corporate identity.178 Absent circumstances that would
support piercing the corporate veil, even the owners of a close corpo-
ration should generally be regarded as occupying a detached role.179
173. Dan-Cohen, supra note 3, at 1237-38.
174. See id. at 1238.
175. See Nelson, supra note 28, at 1586-91.
176. See id. at 1587-91.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 1591-95.
179. Arguably, the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision cuts against the proposition that
the role of a close corporation’s owner should be regarded as a detached one, given that the
Court upheld such a corporation’s ability to raise a claim under the Religious Freedom
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Membership in a church, on the other hand, is an example of a
role that is much more tightly bound to an individual’s identity.180
Thus, to compel a church to speak should attract greater scrutiny,
even though the church may be organized as a nonprofit corporate
entity.
Media entities may well be ones that engender more “nondetach-
ed” roles. For example, in finding that a newspaper’s “exercise of ed-
itorial control and judgment” should be protected, the Supreme
Court characterized the First Amendment intrusion as one of “intru-
sion into the function of editors.”181 In speaking specifically about
editors, rather than simply about the newspaper as a whole, the
Court’s holding may have been animated by an understanding of
editors as occupying a nondetached role. That is, editors may be un-
derstood as speaking not only for the newspaper, but for themselves
as well, in a way that the average corporate executive does not. One
can imagine similar results with respect to a director of a movie, for
example, even if the director is understood to also be speaking for
the movie studio. Thus, compulsions directed at media entities,
entities in the business of speech, may raise constitutional questions
beyond those raised by compulsions directed at corporate entities
generally. This means that the First Amendment treatment of
media corporations need not extend to all corporations.182
Restoration Act in order to vindicate the owners’ claim that their “exercise of religion” had
been burdened. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014). The
Hobby Lobby decision, however, need not control the question of how to regard corporate
compelled speech under the First Amendment. For one thing, Hobby Lobby was a statutory
case, not a constitutional one, and Congress can grant statutory rights to corporations inde-
pendent of any theory of the First Amendment. See id. at 2767 (“By enacting RFRA, Congress
went far beyond what this Court has held is constitutionally required.”). Moreover, freedom
of religion and freedom of speech are distinct constitutional rights, with potentially distinct
contours. In particular, while the Supreme Court has been hesitant to evaluate what counts
as a religious belief, it has shown little hesitation in evaluating what counts as speech.
Compare id. at 2777-78 (framing the appropriate question with respect to RFRA as “whether
the HHS mandate imposes a substantial burden on the ability of the objecting parties to con-
duct business in accordance with their religious beliefs” and rejecting “a very different ques-
tion that the federal courts have no business addressing (whether the religious belief asserted
in a RFRA case is reasonable)”), with Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights,
Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64-65 (2006) (finding that “a law school’s decision to allow recruiters on
campus is not inherently expressive” and “[n]othing about recruiting suggests that law schools
agree with any speech by recruiters”).
180. See Nelson, supra note 28, at 1616-17.
181. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
182. This runs counter to the argument that some have made that First Amendment
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2. Compulsions Conditioned on Speech
Compulsions that are triggered by the compelled entity’s speech
merit greater scrutiny than compulsions that are triggered by
something other than expression. In such cases, we could be
concerned that the compulsion will chill the entity’s voluntary
speech, to the detriment of the audience for that speech.
Most, if not all, of the existing Supreme Court cases scrutinizing
compulsions directed at commercial entities can be explained by the
Court’s concern to avoid chilling those entities’ speech.183 For exam-
ple, the case of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo involved a
Florida statute that required newspapers to print a reply from any
political candidate criticized by a newspaper editorial.184 In holding
the statute unconstitutional, the Court characterized the compul-
sion as one that could chill the newspaper’s own speech, because the
paper might avoid coverage and criticisms that would trigger the
right of reply.185 Later, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission of California, the Court applied similar
reasoning in striking down a requirement that a privately owned
utility company include materials in its billing envelopes from a
ratepayers group with views contrary to those of the utility.186 In
that case, the compulsion was not directly triggered by the utility’s
speech, but because access was “awarded only to those who disagree
with appellant’s views and who are hostile to appellant’s interests,
appellant must contend with the fact that whenever it speaks out on
a given issue, it may be forced ... to help disseminate hostile
views.”187 Under such circumstances, the utility might well decide
that “‘the safe course is to avoid controversy,’ thereby reducing the
free flow of information and ideas that the First Amendment seeks
protection for the “institutional media” implies that the corporate nature of the speaker
cannot be a basis for reduced First Amendment scrutiny. See Redish, supra note 64, at 87-88.
183. See Wu, supra note 15, at 85-88.
184. 418 U.S. at 244.
185. See id. at 257 (“Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that
published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access statute,
editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy. Therefore, under the
operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted or
reduced.”).
186. 475 U.S. 1, 4, 7 (1986) (plurality opinion).
187. Id. at 14.
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to promote.”188 Thus, the focus was again on ensuring the free flow
of information.
Even when the problem has not been one of chilling competing
views, the Court has also expressed concern over compulsions that
might simply displace the entity’s own speech. In Tornillo, the Court
noted the practical constraints that precluded an “infinite expansion
of [the newspaper’s] column space to accommodate the replies that
a government agency determines or a statute commands the readers
should have available.”189 In Pacific Gas & Electric Co., the concur-
ring opinion of Justice Marshall, who provided the crucial fifth vote
in the case, emphasized that “[b]y appropriating, four times a year,
the space in appellant’s envelope that appellant would otherwise
use for its own speech, the State has necessarily curtailed appel-
lant’s use of its own forum.”190
The Court has sometimes in parallel adopted rationales that sug-
gest that the compulsions are inherently problematic, as when the
Court suggested that the forced inclusion of the ratepayers group’s
speech “impermissibly requires [the utility] to associate with speech
with which [it] may disagree,” causing it to “be forced either to
appear to agree with [the ratepayers group’s] views or to respond.”191
Even then, though, the Court emphasized “[t]he danger that [the
utility] will be required to alter its own message.”192 What was
protected by the First Amendment was “the message itself,”193
rather than the corporate messenger, which is consistent with the
188. Id. (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257).
189. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257.
190. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 24 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). Simi-
larly, in holding that intermediate scrutiny applied to the requirement that cable operators
carry local broadcast stations, the Court characterized the requirement as more of a restric-
tion than a compulsion. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636-37 (1994) (“By
requiring cable systems to set aside a portion of their channels for local broadcasters, the
must-carry rules regulate cable speech in two respects: The rules reduce the number of
channels over which cable operators exercise unfettered control, and they render it more
difficult for cable programmers to compete for carriage on the limited channels remaining.”
(emphasis added)).
191. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 15 (plurality opinion).
192. Id. at 16; see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S.
47, 64 (2006) (“The compelled-speech violations in Tornillo and Pacific Gas also resulted from
interference with a speaker’s desired message.”).
193. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 16.
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view that what really matters is whether speech has been restricted,
rather than whether the corporation has been compelled.
3. Deception About the Source of Speech
Finally, greater scrutiny of compelled speech might also be
warranted if the government fails to make it clear that it is the
ultimate source of the compelled speech. In general, if our focus is
on listeners, then not only is the government justified in trying to
eliminate deceptive speech, it should not itself be the source of
deception. This means, first, that the government probably should
not be permitted to compel speech that would be false or misleading
under the Central Hudson test, speech that would be within its
power to restrict without First Amendment constraints.194
This also means that the government should not be permitted to
deceive as to the source or identity of the ultimate speaker. There
are circumstances in which we want to protect the anonymity of
private speakers in order to protect their speech. Otherwise, fear of
either government or private retribution might lead such speakers
to self-censor their speech.195 No such rationale applies when it is
the government that is speaking. Governments are not subject to
retribution in the same way as private speakers.
Indeed, the potential for political “retribution” against the gov-
ernment should not only be permissible; it should be encouraged.
Compelling a commercial entity to say something it does not agree
194. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Srinivasan, J.,
dissenting) (“[M]isleading disclosures would not qualify for Zauderer’s relaxed standard.”). On
the limits of the government’s ability to lie more broadly, see generally Helen Norton, The
Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73 (2015).
195. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 200 (2010) (“Plaintiffs explain that once on the Inter-
net, the petition signers’ names and addresses can be combined with publicly available phone
numbers and maps, in what will effectively become a blueprint for harassment and intimida-
tion.” (internal quotation omitted)); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42
(1995) (“The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official
retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of
one’s privacy as possible. Whatever the motivation may be, at least in the field of literary
endeavor, the interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unques-
tionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry.”); Talley
v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) (“Before the Revolutionary War colonial patriots frequent-
ly had to conceal their authorship or distribution of literature that easily could have brought
down on them prosecutions by English-controlled courts.”).
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with can be framed as the government simply co-opting the resourc-
es of a private party in order to disseminate its own government
speech, an act not so different from the imposition of a special tax.196
The check on abuse of such government power is mainly political,
namely, the ability of majorities to decide who will be elected to
office, and thus what messages the government will espouse.197 In
order for such political accountability to function, however, the elec-
torate needs to understand that the message is indeed the govern-
ment’s, and thus subject to political control. If the government could
co-opt private parties to spread a message without revealing that it
is a government message, it could improperly insulate itself from
that accountability.198
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR SPEECH AMONG COMMERCIAL ENTITIES
Recognizing the distinction between derivative and intrinsic
speech interests also matters in those situations in which none of
the parties to the transaction have intrinsic interests. These provide
another category of cases in which diminished First Amendment
scrutiny is warranted.
A. Transactions Among Commercial Entities
In the paradigmatic corporate or commercial speech scenario, the
speaker may be corporate or commercial, but the listener is an
individual, with at least some noncommercial interests. In that case,
we may protect the speech in order to protect the listener’s First
Amendment interests. If the listener is just as corporate or commer-
cial as the speaker though, then the basis for protecting the speech
disappears, and restrictions on that speech should merit little
scrutiny.
196. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) (“We have generally
assumed, though not yet squarely held, that compelled funding of government speech does not
alone raise First Amendment concerns.”).
197. See Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s
Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 589-90 (2008).
198. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 571-72 (Souter, J., dissenting); Norton, supra note 197, at
596.
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For example, this framing demonstrates why the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) should be regarded as obviously constitu-
tional. On its face, the FCRA appears to restrict speech, since it
prohibits “consumer reporting agencies” from disclosing “consumer
reports” to third parties, except under specified conditions.199 From
the perspective of a consumer reporting agency, a consumer report
is merely an item of commerce, something to be sold for profit,
rather than a means of expression. Still, we might want to protect
consumer reports under the First Amendment if they had expressive
value for the recipients, as they might if the recipients were
individuals, acting in their capacity as citizens.
In fact, the FCRA precludes the possibility that noncommercial
individuals are the ones receiving consumer reports because it
defines a “consumer report” in terms of the commercial purposes to
which it is put. A “consumer report” under the FCRA is:
[A]ny written, oral, or other communication of any information
by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is
used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for
the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s
eligibility for:
(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes; 
(B) employment purposes; or 
(C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this
title.200
By definition, the recipient of a consumer report will be using it as
an input into a commercial transaction, such as deciding whether to
extend credit to the subject of the report. In that way, from the
listener’s perspective, the material restricted by the FCRA is
transactional, not expressive, much as a commercial advertisement
is transactional from the speaker’s perspective. But this means that
an FCRA consumer report is commercial from both the speaker’s
199. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a) (2012) (“Subject to subsection (c) ... any consumer reporting
agency may furnish a consumer report under the following circumstances and no other.”).
200. Id. § 1681a(d)(1).
2050 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:2005
and the listener’s perspectives. The result is that even though we
might want to protect a commercial advertisement in order to
protect the listener’s First Amendment interests, there is nothing
to protect and no reason to impose any heightened scrutiny in the
FCRA context because neither speaker nor listener has a relevant
First Amendment interest.
The FCRA has in fact withstood First Amendment challenges, but
only after facing scrutiny under the Central Hudson test.201 In Trans
Union, the D.C. Circuit appropriately recognized that “the informa-
tion about individual consumers and their credit performance
communicated by Trans Union target marketing lists is solely of
interest to the company and its business customers,” but it failed to
recognize that the consequence should have been minimal scru-
tiny.202 The D.C. Circuit attempted to draw guidance from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., but that decision relied mainly on the credit reports
at issue involving no “matter[s] of public concern,” a characteriza-
tion that on its face applied regardless of whether the recipients
were commercial or noncommercial.203 While the ultimate result of
the Trans Union case was the same as if minimal scrutiny had been
imposed, that will not always be the case.204
Another situation that ought to involve minimal First Amend-
ment scrutiny is that of regulation of data brokers or of transfers of
personal data among commercial entities.205 For example, in Sorrell
v. IMS Health Inc., the Court invalidated a Vermont law that
prohibited the sale, disclosure, or use of pharmacy records about the
prescribing practices of individual doctors for marketing purposes.206
The main form of disclosure targeted by the regulation was the
transfer of the data from the pharmacy through an intermediary
like IMS Health to the pharmaceutical companies, which would
then use the information to customize their sales pitches to
doctors.207 Ultimately, the Court ruled that the infirmity in the
201. See Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 818-19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
202. Id. at 818.
203. 472 U.S. 749, 761-62 (1985).
204. See Wu, supra note 15, at 81-82.
205. See id. at 90.
206. See 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011). Those records are referred to as “prescriber-identifying
information.” Id. at 558.
207. See id. at 558. The process of promoting drugs to doctors is known as “detailing.” Id.
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Vermont law was in denying to the pharmaceutical companies
access to the prescriber-identifying information, while permitting
access by many others, including groups interested in countering
the pharmaceutical companies and promoting the use of generic
drugs.208 In dicta, however, the Court suggested that perhaps the
restriction on transfer was itself directly problematic, insofar as “the
creation and dissemination of information are speech within the
meaning of the First Amendment.”209
Whatever the merits of treating the transfer of information from
the pharmacy to the pharmaceutical company as “speech” in the ab-
stract,210 this “speech” occurs entirely between two parties, neither
of which have intrinsic First Amendment interests. In the usual
case, both parties will be major for-profit corporations. But even if
the transaction was between individuals, it would still be commer-
cial with respect to both the speaker and the listener. For the
pharmacist-speaker, the prescription data is an item of commerce
because its value is entirely private, no more than the counter-
party’s willingness to pay for it.211 It is not a means for the pharma-
cist to express herself.212 Similarly, for the pharmaceutical company-
recipient, the data is an input into the commercial transaction of
marketing drugs to doctors. This commercial use is certainly not the
only possible use that could be made of the data, but it is the one the
statute covered.213 Just as the FCRA merits minimal scrutiny
because it is limited to recipients who are receiving the information
for commercial purposes,214 so too should a regulation on the trans-
fer of prescription data merit minimal scrutiny when it is limited to
recipients making a commercial use of the data.
at 557.
208. See id. at 564.
209. Id. at 570.
210. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of
Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 875-76 (2012) (arguing that such a transfer should receive full
First Amendment protection “only when the speech contributes meaningfully to the demo-
cratic process of self-governance”).
211. Cf. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) (describing the situation
as one “in which information itself has become a commodity,” not unlike “beef jerky”). 
212. See id.
213. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 558-59.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 199-204.
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B. Privacy Invasions by Commercial Entities
Some commentators have argued that privacy laws burden
freedom of expression and should receive heightened scrutiny under
the First Amendment.215 This potentially includes not only laws that
stop people from talking about others,216 but also laws that inhibit
the gathering and creation of information in the first place.217 Those
that have advocated First Amendment scrutiny of privacy laws have
not generally distinguished between commercial entities and
individuals acquiring the same information.218
The broader question of whether there is or should be a First
Amendment right to gather information is beyond the scope of this
Article. Even if there should be, however, it should be one that
attaches to noncommercial individuals, rather than corporate or
commercial entities. In the context of privacy laws, the person from
whom the information is being extracted is often not a willing
participant in the transaction.219 There is no willing “speaker,” and
thus, no speaker-based interests to protect. When the entity collect-
ing the information lacks intrinsic First Amendment interests,
restrictions on that collection merit little First Amendment scrutiny,
just as in the case of a commercial speaker transacting with a
commercial recipient.
Thus, even if we protect the newsgatherer or the photographer or
acts of gathering information that “inform[ ] people,”220 we need not
similarly protect, for example, the large-scale consumer data
tracking that is now pervasive.221 An entity that gathers information
about users’ web browsing in order to target advertisements to those
users is collecting information that is, from that entity’s perspective,
nothing more than a component of commercial activity. In this way,
215. See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60 (2014); Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop
People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051-52 (2000).
216. See Volokh, supra note 215, at 1050-51.
217. See Bambauer, supra note 215, at 61.
218. See id. at 106-09.
219. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 246 (9th Cir. 1971) (involving a re-
cording made of a conversation in someone’s home without his consent).
220. See Bambauer, supra note 215, at 60-61, 77-81.
221. See, e.g., Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL STREET J. (July
30, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703940904575395073512989404
[https://perma.cc/4S7X-83ZC].
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the targeted advertising company is similarly situated to the
recipient of a consumer report under the FCRA or the pharmaceuti-
cal companies in Sorrell.222 As in those cases, the targeted advertis-
ing company lacks intrinsic First Amendment interests. Because
regulation of targeted advertising does not generally impinge upon
the users’ First Amendment interests, there are no First Amend-
ment interests at stake in such regulation, and thus any First
Amendment scrutiny of such regulations should be minimal.223
C. Indirect Regulation of Noncommercial Transactions
In some situations, though surely not all, commercial entities
might be receiving or collecting information that they will ultimate-
ly pass on to individuals.224 In those cases, we might be concerned
that restricting the activities of these commercial entities might
ultimately restrict noncommercial ones, and thus First Amendment
scrutiny would still be appropriate, even if the interest of the
commercial entities were understood as merely derivative.
At the outset, it is important to note that not every restriction on
a commercial entity impinges upon a derivative interest. The phar-
maceutical companies in Sorrell did not acquire prescriber-identify-
ing information in order to thereby pass that information on to
individuals.225
Even when there may be an underlying noncommercial interest
at stake, however, and therefore some First Amendment inquiry is
appropriate, recognizing the commercial interest as a derivative one
circumscribes the nature of any resulting First Amendment review.
The direct effects of a privacy regulation on a commercial entity like
222. See supra Part III.A.
223. To the extent that a regulation impedes willing users’ ability to provide information
for use in advertising, perhaps there are still some First Amendment interests at stake. The
nature and strength of such interests, however, are quite different from those premised on
intrinsic interests on the part of the advertisers. See infra Part IV.
224. Professor Bambauer gives the example of LexisNexis. See Bambauer, supra note 215,
at 106-07.
225. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 558 (2011). The data intermediary IMS
Health does provide data to a wide range of recipients, though. See Our Company, QUINTILES
IMS, http://www.imshealth.com/en/about-us/our-company [https://perma.cc/PKS3-WL49]
(“Customers include pharmaceutical, consumer and health medical device manufacturers and
distributors, providers, payers, government agencies, policymakers, researchers and the
financial community.”).
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LexisNexis are legitimate. It is only the indirect effects on potential
noncommercial recipients that are cause for concern.
When the government legitimately targets one kind of activity,
but the government action might have problematic indirect speech
effects, First Amendment review is substantially more deferential
than when the direct effects of the government action are the
subject of review. Consider, for example, the scrutiny applied to a
content-neutral regulation. Such a regulation is constitutional:
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest.226
The O’Brien test has often been called an intermediate scrutiny
test,227 just as the Central Hudson test has been called an intermedi-
ate scrutiny test in the context of commercial speech.228 The “inter-
mediate scrutiny” of the O’Brien test is not nearly as exacting as the
“intermediate scrutiny” of the Central Hudson test, though. If the
Central Hudson test has been applied in a manner that sometimes
borders on strict scrutiny, the O’Brien test has sometimes been
applied in a manner that borders on rational basis review.
Consider the O’Brien case itself, which involved the constitution-
ality of a law against burning draft cards.229 The defendant in that
case argued quite reasonably that the burning of a draft card made
no real difference to the actual operation of the draft system.230 It
was not as if the holder of the draft card were burning the actual
record of his registration held by the government. The draft card
itself was a mere receipt, a document that recorded relevant facts,
such as the identity and registration status of a particular individ-
ual, but that did not itself make any of those facts more or less
true.231 And yet the Court found that burning the draft card would
226. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
227. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26-27 (2010).
228. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995).
229. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 375.
230. See id. at 378.
231. See id.
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impede “the smooth and proper functioning” of the draft system.232
According to the Court, Congress had a “substantial interest” in
preventing the destruction of these “receipts,” so as to avoid “a mix-
up in the registrant’s file,” to make it easier for the registrant to
contact his local board, and to remind the registrant to notify the
board of any address changes.233 In justifying the law under these
rationales, the Court made no real attempt to ask whether there
was a serious problem with any of these issues or whether the
regulation would be at all effective in addressing these problems.
Contrast this with the commercial speech cases involving
restrictions on advertising for alcohol, cigarettes, and gambling.234
In applying the Central Hudson test in those cases, courts have
rigorously scrutinized the government’s evidence to determine how
much the government’s interests would in fact be advanced by the
challenged regulations.235 What potentially justifies the difference
between the stringent Central Hudson review and the relatively
more relaxed O’Brien review is that in the commercial speech cases,
the effects on speech are the direct and intended effect of the
regulations, rather than merely a byproduct, leading the courts to
be much more skeptical of such regulations.
In the context of indirect regulation of noncommercial trans-
actions, it is the more relaxed O’Brien-type review that should ap-
ply.236 Thus, just as a content-neutral regulation is valid so long as
it is tailored to the permissible noncontent aim and does not have
excessive impermissible content-based effects,237 regulation of com-
mercial data collection, itself a permissible aim, should at a mini-
mum be permitted so long as the regulation is tailored to that aim
and does not have excessive effects on the ability of individuals to
collect information. Such an analysis recognizes that the commercial
actor directly collecting the information lacks intrinsic First Amend-
ment interests, while accounting for the interests of noncommercial
individuals that the regulation may affect.
232. Id. at 381.
233. Id. at 378-80.
234. See cases cited supra note 113.
235. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505-07 (1996) (opinion of
Stevens, J.).
236. See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1418 (2000).
237. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMERCIAL SPEECH DIRECTED AT
UNWILLING LISTENERS
The derivative nature of corporate and commercial speech also
has important implications in cases involving listeners who wish to
block out a commercial entity’s speech. In a noncommercial context,
the listener’s interests potentially need to be balanced against the
speaker’s.238 In a commercial context, though, once we understand
that the commercial speaker’s interests are merely derivative of the
listener’s interests, then it becomes easy to see that as between the
commercial speaker and the unwilling listener, it is only the
interests of the unwilling listener that matter. Thus, unwilling
listener cases are much more easily resolved in commercial contexts
than in noncommercial ones.239
For example, there is no sensible argument that “do-not-call”
regulations violate the First Amendment.240 The telemarketing calls
restricted by the do-not-call regulations are corporate or commercial
speech,241 and thus are protected only to protect the recipients’
access to such speech. If those recipients have specifically indicated
that they do not wish to receive such calls, the telemarketers have
no intrinsic First Amendment interest in speaking nevertheless.242
While the Tenth Circuit ultimately upheld the do-not-call regula-
tions against a First Amendment challenge, it did so only after
applying the Central Hudson test.243 In so doing, the court relied
heavily on the evidence the government had put forward about the
extent of the problem of unwanted telemarketing and the inade-
quacy of proposed alternatives.244 There should have been no need,
however, to clear a hurdle designed to preserve listeners’ access to
238. See supra note 12.
239. See Jaynes v. Commonwealth, 666 S.E.2d 303, 313 (Va. 2008) (striking down a law
prohibiting false routing information in unsolicited bulk e-mail, where the law was “not
limited to instances of commercial or fraudulent transmission of e-mail”).
240. See Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 2004).
241. See id. at 1236 (“The national do-not-call registry’s telemarketing restrictions apply
only to commercial speech.”).
242. See supra Part I.
243. See Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 358 F.3d at 1236, 1246.
244. See id. at 1241, 1244-45.
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information in a case about whether those listeners could refuse to
receive that information.
And the level of scrutiny can make a real difference to the out-
come of a case, particularly when privacy interests are involved.245
In an earlier case, U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, the Tenth Circuit had
come to the opposite conclusion about the constitutionality of an
FCC order restricting telecommunications carriers from using
customer information for marketing purposes, striking down the
order after applying the Central Hudson test.246 In that case, the
court expressed its “concerns” about the privacy justification the
government proffered, and it required the government to “specify
the particular notion of privacy and interest served” and to establish
that the interest was “substantial.”247 Construing the relevant pri-
vacy interest narrowly to be that of avoiding embarrassment,248 the
court found no evidence that embarrassing disclosures would occur
in the absence of the challenged order, and thus no evidence of real
harm to justify the order.249
But if the First Amendment claim here is supposed to protect the
customer’s access to marketing information, and that customer
objects to having his personal information used for those marketing
purposes, there is simply no First Amendment claim to raise at all.
Any First Amendment interest that the carrier has is derivative of
the interests of the very individual against whom the carrier is
opposed.
It is possible that some of the customers were not in fact unwill-
ing recipients, and that those customers’ interests in receiving mar-
keting information on the basis of their data were burdened by the
245. See Wu, supra note 15, at 81-82.
246. See U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1240 (10th Cir. 1999). The challenged order
applied to “customer proprietary network information,” which included call data, and it
largely prohibited carriers from using or disclosing the information except to provide the
relevant telecommunications service. See id. at 1228 & n.1; see also 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012).
247. U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1234-35.
248. See id. at 1235. The government had justified the order on the basis that information
about “to whom, where, and when a customer places a call” was information that could be
“extremely personal to customers” and “equally or more sensitive [than the content of the
calls].” Id. at 1235 (alteration in original) (quoting Implementation of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 13 FCC Rcd. 8061, 8064, 8133 (1998)). The potential for embarrassment is but
one possible privacy interest at stake in the use or disclosure of call data. See Neil M.
Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013).
249. See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1237-38.
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order’s requirement to opt in to the use of their data. One could then
argue that scrutiny might be warranted in order to ensure access by
these willing customers to valuable marketing information, particu-
larly if an opt-in requirement is seen as a substantial barrier to the
flow of that information.250 The First Amendment might be impli-
cated to the extent necessary to protect the speech interests of
willing listeners, the ones who wanted to have their information
used for marketing.
Framed in this manner, however, the First Amendment interests
are easily seen to be far less weighty than the courts have generally
characterized them, and thus even if some scrutiny might be war-
ranted in these circumstances, it surely should not be at the level of
the Central Hudson test. The government regulation does not con-
strain the speech that consumers can choose to receive.251 In order
to receive a particular kind of marketing, the consumer need only
affirmatively choose to receive it.252 Moreover, just as the economic
incentive of the commercial speaker is thought to be sufficient to
minimize any chilling effect from the imposition of liability for
misleading commercial speech,253 that same economic incentive can
overcome the barriers created by the need to obtain opt-in consent.
Commercial speakers have every incentive to make it as easy as
possible for consumers to opt in to marketing.254
This same analysis could have been applied in the case of Sorrell
v. IMS Health Inc.255 In that case, the Supreme Court ultimately
grounded its decision to strike down the Vermont law not in the
law’s restriction of the transfer of data from pharmacies to pharma-
ceutical companies, but in the law’s restriction of the pharmaceuti-
cal companies’ marketing practices to doctors.256 Here too, as in U.S.
West, the real First Amendment interests were not those of the
companies marketing to doctors, but those of the doctors interested
250. See Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cate, The Impact of Opt-In Privacy Rules on Retail
Credit Markets: A Case Study of MBNA, 52 DUKE L.J. 745, 766 (2003).
251. See id. at 765.
252. See id.
253. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 n.24 (1976).
254. See Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1101 (1999).
255. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
256. See id. at 571.
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in receiving information about brand-name drugs from the compa-
nies.257 And again, the law at issue did not prevent the doctors from
receiving detailing visits, or even detailing visits tailored to their
prescription practices.258 The doctors need only have opted in to such
marketing. On that view, it would seem that the Court’s heightened
scrutiny was misplaced.
Still, the Court’s decision seems to have been animated by its
view that the Vermont law was not really about marketing that the
doctors did not want, but rather about marketing that the state did
not want. As the Court put it, the defect in the law was that it
“burdened a form of protected expression that it found too persua-
sive.”259 This rationale is very much in line with the core rationale
expressed by the Court in its corporate and commercial speech
cases, namely that the First Amendment casts doubt on any regula-
tion meant to limit particular advertising messages.260 If the Court
viewed the Vermont statute to have been aimed at suppressing the
message that doctors should prescribe brand-name drugs, then
perhaps some First Amendment skepticism was warranted.
Read in this way, the Sorrell decision is a narrow one. It perhaps
limits the government’s ability to restrict marketing on the basis of
the message conveyed, but it does not limit the government’s ability
to restrict marketing on the basis of whether the listener wants it.261
It should thus pose no impediment, for example, to a regulation
requiring websites to honor a do-not-track or do-not-target signal.262
Such a requirement might seem superficially similar to the one at
issue in Sorrell, insofar as both requirements restrict the use of
257. See id. at 578.
258. Id. at 573.
259. See id. at 580.
260. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (opinion of Stevens,
J.).
261. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 575 (suggesting that a statute designed to give physicians
greater control over the use of their information might pass muster because then the statute’s
design would be “unrelated to any purpose to advance a preferred message”). But see id.
(“Many are those who must endure speech they do not like, but that is a necessary cost of
freedom.”); Piety, supra note 73, at 4-5 (arguing that Sorrell represents a “major doctrinal
shift” in “turning the rationale for commercial speech doctrine upside down by putting the
speaker, rather than the public interest, at the center of the analysis”).
262. Cf. Agatha M. Cole, Note, Internet Advertising After Sorrell v. IMS Health: A Discus-
sion on Data Privacy & the First Amendment, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283, 309-10
(2012).
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certain personal information for marketing purposes. A restriction
on behavioral advertising, however, would be aimed not at limiting
particular messages, but at recognizing the consumers’ preferences
not to have their information used to market to them in particular
ways.
Similarly, the First Amendment imposes no impediment to the
government regulating marketing techniques that unduly take
advantage of consumer weaknesses. Thus, for example, the govern-
ment can restrict in-person solicitation by lawyers, at least to the
extent that such solicitation involves “fraud, undue influence, in-
timidation, overreaching, and other forms of vexatious conduct.”263
Again, because the First Amendment value of the solicitation speech
lies in its value to the recipient, rather than the speaker, there can
be no infringement on First Amendment rights in a regulation that
protects the recipient in that encounter. If there is a potential First
Amendment problem, it would lie only in the possibility that a
regulation aimed at protecting some listeners ends up restricting
valuable speech to other listeners.264 More broadly, the First Amend-
ment should not restrict government attempts to control forms of
undue influence in marketing.265 In the marketing transaction, the
First Amendment interests are those of the consumers, and thus,
unless there is a conflict among consumers, consumer protection
measures cannot run afoul of the First Amendment.266
CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators have tended to think that the corporate
or commercial nature of speech makes either no difference or all the
difference. In fact, the choice need not be so stark. By understanding
the derivative nature of these speech interests, one can see why
commerciality can make a difference in some scenarios and not
263. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 461-62 (1978) (internal quotation
omitted).
264. See id. at 468-69 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(expressing “concern that disciplinary rules not be utilized to obstruct the distribution of legal
services to all those in need of them”).
265. See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1038-40
(2014).
266. “Consumer protection” here means protecting consumers from overreach by sellers,
not “protecting” consumers from themselves.
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others. Compelled speech, transactions among commercial entities,
and unwanted speech are all settings in which commercial speech
can be regulated with minimal First Amendment scrutiny, even if
the equivalent regulation of noncommercial speech would attract
much more stringent review.
Underlying the commercial difference is the speech difference—
that is, the idea that there is something different about speech as
compared to other human activity. Failing to recognize the differ-
ence between commercial and noncommercial speech in the settings
in which it should matter is often rooted in a failure to differentiate
between speech and commercial conduct. The blurring of that
distinction creates a situation in which First Amendment protection
becomes unhinged from any theoretical underpinnings. When that
occurs, both free speech and sensible government regulation lose
out.
